The idea that modern nations can be described as 'imagined communities' created through communication and interaction (Anderson, 1991) has prompted a shift of perspective in political theory. The focus of research has widened beyond the study of administrative practices to include the field of literature, the media and, broadly speaking, the practices of seeing enacted as people devise specific communal structures. Hence, the creation and preservation of sociopolitical institutions and the negotiations over models of collective and individual identity are no longer the exclusive concern of political science; rather, they are now approachable by cultural and literary studies. This shift underlies our analytical strategy as we seek to grasp the role that literature can play in the legitimation of political power: 
The idea that modern nations can be described as 'imagined communities' created through communication and interaction (Anderson, 1991) has prompted a shift of perspective in political theory. The focus of research has widened beyond the study of administrative practices to include the field of literature, the media and, broadly speaking, the practices of seeing enacted as people devise specific communal structures. Hence, the creation and preservation of sociopolitical institutions and the negotiations over models of collective and individual identity are no longer the exclusive concern of political science; rather, they are now approachable by cultural and literary studies. This shift underlies our analytical strategy as we seek to grasp the role that literature can play in the legitimation of political power:
(i) Beyond its well-known function of social criticism, literature offers relevant insight into the genesis and consolidation of different forms of governance. In addition to representing political issues, literary works of art can stage and test the narratives that justify political practices or accompany them rhetorically. Fictional environments and the seeming gratuitousness of the literary devices allow for a far-reaching exploration of these narratives. (ii) Literary heroes and their narrative environments incite various forms of reader response, as the Constance school of literary reception has shown. Hans Robert Jauss associates the term 'catharsis' with aesthetic experience at large. He defines this experience as a projection of the reading self (or the contemplating theater public) onto a foreign self and describes the literary techniques or patterns of interaction that allow us to identify with the hero. Drawing on the 'communicative efficacy of aesthetic experience', Jauss demonstrates how literary works and the cathartic experiences they provide allow readers to mediate between fictional scenarios and political reality (Jauss, 1982 , part A/7 and part B/1-2). (iii) In the years after 1989, the former Soviet countries underwent dramatic changes that were felt as keenly in the literary domain as elsewhere. The fact that writers were no longer perceived as the mouthpieces of state propaganda or as 'engineers of the human soul' (Stalin), however, did not fundamentally compromise their social status. Once divested of these functions, literature could develop into an area of a dogmatically unfettered search for ideals of social order; community models are put to test through the characters of a fictional tale or, in other words, through literary figures living out possible worlds.. (iv) Literature as a technique of world making has a negative counterpart in which its critical, enlightening functions are sacrificed for the benefit of political mythology. In The Myth of the State, Ernst Cassirer identified three basic elements of political myth: 'a change in the function of language', the 'introduction of new rites' and 'a new art of divination ' (1946, p. 282-9) . While new functions of language can be experimentally performed in -and finally instituted by -works of literature, the notions of 'ritual' and 'divination' point to another function of literature compatible with Cassirer's theory: Literary works can offer an affirmative or critical reenactment of the past, but also sociopolitical prophecy -a fact that is particularly relevant with regard to modern forms of Russian authoritarianism.
Post-Soviet authoritarianism and the media
It is difficult to grasp the essence of Russia's 'managed democracy' without accounting for the role of the media. Although the aestheticization and mediatization of politics are not purely Russian phenomena, postSoviet authoritarianism draws heavily on their effects. In certain aspects, the political processes of the Putin era are reminiscent of Guy Debord's concept of a society of the spectacle, where the political media representations are coeval with the public's growing consumption potential. Media render the borders between reality and its simulation permeable.
It seems that the impact of this process is particularly significant in Russia. The central manifestations are -and the dominantly mediatized narratives convey -(1) a strong personalization of politics, (2) the fear of a chaotic democratization fostered by the European Union, (3) the sweeping belief that Russia is threatened by scheming neighbors and (4) the assertion that the country can break free from this encirclement only by regaining its former status as an imperial superpower.
The personalization of public issues and the focus on a strong leader are decisive cultural requisites of politics as a media event. Initially serving as the 'spectacular representation of a living human being', a celebrity from the political or media sphere eventually becomes the pseudo-real protagonist of a 'society of the spectacle'. 'In the former case, government power assumes the personified form of the pseudostar; in the second, stars of consumption canvas for votes as pseudopower over life lived' (Debord, 1994, p. 61) . The centerpiece of the Russian media spectacle is the figure of Vladimir Putin, constantly trying out new roles and masks. It has been demonstrated that the sophisticated iconography attached to the Russian president serves political goals that go far beyond the stereotypes of heroism; the national leader's implied strength, combined with a projection depicting Russia regaining its imperial strength, simulates a situation of political stability meant to eclipse both the country's loss of status in international affairs and the creeping social unrest (Engelfried, 2012) .
For many years, Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov propagated the idea that the Russian people were not ready to live in a democratic state (see Remchukov, 2007) . References to the 'deep roots of Russian national culture' were intended to bolster the system of so-called sovereign democracy, which features a number of political movements and parties, orchestrated elections, a parliament in which there is 'no room for discussions', 1 and above all a de facto almighty president at its head. This system was defined as a mechanism protecting the immature populace from its own inabilities. A corollary function of the concepts of Russian national culture and of sovereign democracy (employing a second meaning for the concept of sovereignty) is to defend Russia against a purportedly hostile international environment.
The architects of the reconstructed Russian power vertical learned their lessons from the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Drawing a sharp contrast with the tediousness of official Soviet politics, the new Russian authoritarianism developed into a highly dynamic media performance that included staged discussions and scandals; the result was an artful combination of infotainment and propaganda. However, the self-portrayal of the Russian state in the media also offered a sustained contrast to bitter daily realities such as crime, drug abuse, poverty and corruption. Against this backdrop, the Kremlin presented itself not only as a center of power but also as an antipode to the bleakness of reality, and consequently as a pillar of justice, order and general welfare. Literature, theater and cinema have the ability to create an imaginary reality that casts a spell across the audience; similarly, Russian 'political technology' (polittekhnologiia) has succeeded in producing a simulacrum of political reality.
Managed democracy does not consist simply of crushing the opposition or persecuting dissidents (as in Soviet times). Instead, it has developed the ability to imitate the rhetoric of all kinds of ideologies -from the liberal and socialdemocratic to the national-patriotic and religiousfundamentalist. The regime's eager embrace of various legitimizing narratives has given the Russian executive significant opportunities for ideological maneuver. Thus, it has avoided being labeled on the basis of opposition-based categories such as liberal versus conservative, progressive versus traditional, or egalitarian versus elitist. In other words, Russian political ideologists implemented a kind of bricolage, a technique that allows for the most outlandish combinations of discourse. Its masterpiece is probably sovereign democracy -a forged concept that ultimately takes on a meaning wholly contrary to that of its individual elements.
II

The degree zero of the rule of law: Natan Dubovitskii''s Almost Zero
Since Putin's ascent to power, Vladislav Surkov, a former theater director who moved to the political stage, has come to be recognized as the mastermind behind the Russian society of the spectacle. General excitement therefore ensued when rumors spread in 2009 that Surkov had published a novel. The book, entitled Okolonol'ia (Almost Zero), was ostensibly written by a Natan Dubovitskii' -a pseudonym which bears a strong resemblance to the maiden name of Surkov's wife Natalia Dubovitskaia.
The question of whether or not Vladislav Surkov is in fact the author of this novel is less important than the effect produced by the surrounding media speculation. It is worthwhile exploring the novel's spiritual world, no matter whether or not it genuinely reveals the outlook of the Russian political elite. Almost Zero offers a grotesque and brutal picture of Russian reality; indeed, the novel contains a huge catalog of crimes: corruption, bribery, contract killings, protection racket, state investments in wives, brothers-in-law, and nieces; the renting of positions of power to crooks and well-connected parvenus; cooperative trading in positions, decorations of honor, awards, titles; controlling the cash-flow; court rulings for sale, profitable patriotism. (Dubovitskii', [2009], p. 115-16) 2 In the world of this novel, it is little wonder that the value of human life is almost zero, too. Since his youth, Yegor Samokhodov, the novel's smart protagonist, has been able to see through the lies of Soviet ideology and morals. After the collapse of communism, he earns his life as a copyright pirate, as ghostwriter for various politicians and as a specialist for the criminal privatization of publishing houses. In the Russian 1990s, which are rife with murder, betrayal and nepotism, Yegor's career takes off, as he perfectly satisfies his rich clients' demands for PR material, which he plagiarizes or obtains through crooked deals. He commits numerous crimes on his way to the top, ranging from defamation to contract killing. In the world of Almost Zero, moral flexibility is valued as an indicator of maturity and of being free from dangerous illusions. Now familiar with the rules of the new society's game, Yegor rapidly becomes an indispensable manipulator in the wings of state power. Having acknowledged his artistic failure as an aspiring writer, he is now pulling the strings and pursuing a single aim: the acquisition of power that allows for an artful restructuring of reality. The following sample may suffice to illustrate Yegor's creative vision of the world (and the author's somewhat plain conception of avant-garde writing):
The everyday outfit of life, a dense accumulation of steel sheet and flesh, the half-defrosted meat of wild Moscow, sinewy and dripping with fat, leaving a metallic taste -that is what he was and what his strength fed on -or, more exactly, his everyday surface, his ordinary envelope. Yegor carefully separated all of this from the deep solemnity of the Universe, where in a shining abyss fleshless, unpiloted, pathless words were at play, combining freely with and separating from one another, and sometimes melting together to form wonderful patterns.
(ibid., p. 32)
The dualistic vision pervading the text is articulated thus by the novel's hero:
There The fictitious freedom of choice -between an evil that cannot be prevented and a total collapse of the state -is a basic topos of Russian managed democracy. Thus, Almost Zero quite directly addresses the issue of legitimacy. In the face of a Russian bellum omnium contra omnes, it conjures a supreme leader whose charismatic power is able to contain the aggressive energies of the citizens. The oligarchic elite delegates its power to a personalized authority in order to guarantee its own safety from legal and popular interference. A further comparison of this regime with the society sketched in Hobbes's Leviathan reveals interesting differences, however; instead of the Hobbesian 'common-wealth' and its 'civil laws', Dubovitskii' defends a society fashioned on the model of a gang of robbers ruled over by a despotic chief. Lucid critics of Almost Zero observed that the whitewash of state rulers and their behavior is paired with a persistent stance of elitist superiority by the narrator and protagonist. Reviewing the novel, Viktor Yerofeev declares himself numbed by the 'power of contempt' pervading the text (Yerofeev, 2009) .
We therefore argue that Almost Zero is above all an eloquent plea for cynicism -as a collective stance within the elite and as a guideline for individual behavior. In 2013, a group of sociologists discussed the effect of cynicism with regard to legitimating Putin's regime. Lev Gudkov's penetrating analysis highlighted the precariousness of power holders' legitimacy by pointing to the way social identities deemed to oppose the regime are neutralized. As a kind of refined aggression or polite terrorism, cynicism has become 'a weapon of social conflict, a destroyer of your opponents' values and at the same time [ . . . ] a demonstration of the cynic's claims to be superior to the objects of his or her cynicism' (Gudkov, 2013; our italics) . Practiced on a massive scale, the cynical act of self-assertion induces a devaluation of law and of the idea of justice in the long run. However, it also has immediate consequences: social order in general is seen as something unfair, [ . . . ] Confronted with this code, citizens can develop neither any genuine acceptance of the regime nor any belief in its legitimacy; their commitment is narrowed to an 'interest in obedience' for the sake of personal survival (ibid.; see also Gudkov, 2007, p. 3, 5-9 ).
Fundamentalist mythmaking: Aleksandr Prokhanov's 'Pravoslavnyi Stalinizm'
Compared with Dubovitskii''s text, Aleksandr Prokhanov's novels are based on far more straightforward notions of truth, society and nation. The writer links several novels into a chronicle covering the years from the late Soviet Union through Putin's second presidential mandate. The recurrent protagonist is Viktor Belosel'tsev, initially an active and later a retired KGB general. As the collapsing Soviet regime and the subsequent Yel'tsin administration progressively 'neglect' or even paralyze the KGB, Belosel'tsev has plenty of time for an investigation into the deeper sense of these years. This perspective is arguably the origin of Prokhanov's popularity; his texts often read like the causerie of a former official who is privy to important military and government secrets. Part of the public acclamation for his prose may come from past and present army and secret-service personnel who -as victims of the crisis and the waning financial power of the Soviet regime -no longer want to feel they are useless.
In Mr. Hexogen, a novel first published in 2002, the national leader, a character reminiscent of Putin, is presented as 'the Chosen One'. This messianic savior of Russia appears as an enigmatic figure, almost a man without qualities. Hence, to no great surprise, he is able to turn into a transcendent 'ray of light' at the end of the novel -an image well attuned to the unreality of his existence. Despite these and other symptoms of aesthetic illiteracy, but perhaps impressed by Prokhanov's occasional digs at Putin, the publishing house Ad Marginem, famous for publishing figures such as Prigov, Deleuze and Foucault, released Mr. Hexogen, a decision bitterly censured by leading intellectuals (see Ryklin et al., 2002) . The book subsequently received the prestigious National Bestseller award, lifting Prokhanov out of marginality; Mr. Hexogen was perceived as a turning point in contemporary Russian literature, as it was the first national-patriotic novel to receive recognition in post-modernist circles.
The novel describes a conspiracy aimed at unleashing war in the Caucasus region (the Second Chechen War); the military conflict is a pretext for replacing a senile Russian president with a smart younger 'heir'. This successor, previously unknown to his fellow countrymen, is initially regarded by those who chose him (the oligarchs and the former president's family) as the candidate willing to guarantee them freedom from criminal persecution and to safeguard their financial interests. The plot of the novel is based on the events that accompanied the enthronement of Vladimir Putin, and more specifically -the title of the novel alludes to a powerful explosive -the 1999 Moscow and Volgodonsk apartment bombings and the foiled bomb attack in Riazan' (see Thom, 2014, p. 705) . In addition, the novel draws on the stock plots of Russian political thrillers, featuring Hollywood-style action scenes and underhanded behavior by various intelligence agencies.
In this environment, Belosel'tsev cuts a somewhat paradoxical figure. Rather than intervening directly in the political process, he steadfastly delivers words of wisdom and sermons on justice and altruism; with Protestant fervor, the KGB officer criticizes a political elite that has degenerated since the fall of communism. It is argued that the officers of the secret services have lost all of their former influence, quite as the post-Soviet political elites have forgotten their duty to create a just society. Belosel'tsev revolts against this state of affairs, which his 'pure nature' cannot accept. Prokhanov's narrator, merging with the central character in free indirect style, eulogizes the Soviet era as an honest and harmonious era, in striking opposition to the media spectacle of today's Russia.
However, Prokhanov purges the Soviet past of all Marxist and leftist connotations, viewing the whole epoch primarily from the perspective of lost imperial grandeur. While heroes of war and labor are portrayed with iconographic piety (ultimately facilitating their pseudo-Christian canonization), Lenin and other ideologically fraught historical figures lack the aura of holiness. In a crucial episode of Mr. Hexogen, Belosel'tsev decides to start a quest for the metaphysical 'red sense' of Russian life and visits various remnants of the Soviet era, including Lenin's mausoleum. Yet, all he can find in this sacred site of Communism is the body of a man 'whose dead disgusting flesh hung over the enameled bathtub pressing twisted dirty towels' (Prokhanov, 2002, p. 36) .
In its evaluation of the Soviet past, this scene establishes a perspective that can be defined as 'epic distance'; the Soviet era has reached its ultimate conclusion and can be considered as a glorious chapter of Russian history:
Belosel'tsev understood that a great epoch had irrevocably come to its end, an epoch that towered over the rest of history like a solar prominence. As a witness to this closure, Belosel'tsev felt himself coming to an end as well, bereaved of his strongest and best abilities. His love, his devotion to duty, but also the highest sense of his existence had been burnt in the mysterious flare erupting from the hidden depths of the Universe [ . . . ] . (Prokhanov, 2002, p. 36) Soviet history exemplifies a high ideal of righteous conduct. Prokhanov translates this idea into a threefold appraisal of the old order: he exalts a pantheon of heroes, imperial grandeur and the Soviet industrial achievement. The epic-distance perspective has further advantages as well, as it helps to transform a comparatively well-documented historic period into myth. The ultimate outcome of such mythmaking is Prokhanov's notion of 'pravoslavnyi' stalinizm' -a conceptual hybrid that might be rendered as either Russian Christian Stalinism or Stalinist True Christian Faith. 3 The combination of the two incompatible collective symbols is supposed to conflate the legitimizing force of (1) pious Russian traditions, (2) the enthusiasm of Soviet-era mobilization campaigns and (3) the security promises of a strong state and imperial superpower. Hence, Red Square becomes 'a temple in the open' and Soviet nuclear plants are referred to as 'atomic sanctuaries'. The evanescent symbolic capital of Soviet communism is promoted from the domain of history into a realm of transcendent value, acquiring thereby the dignity of myth.
The Soviet era, now taking on monumental proportions, is contrasted with the contemporary era of political media performances. The grotesque characters of the villains, who are reminiscent of Russia's leading politicians and other prominent public figures of the late 1990s, appear viler than ordinary criminals. Indeed, the villains and other people that stand in the way of Prokhanov's hero provide an endless list of human sins and perversions, ranging from vampirism and necrophilia to anthropophagy. Prokhanov's extensive use of zoological and botanic metaphors not only serves as a signal for evil characters but also has a dehumanizing effect.
In Mr. Hexogen, a primary target of Belosel'tsev's hatred, a figure alluding to the Jewish media owner Boris Berezovskyi, is presented thus: 'Zaretsky began to lose his contour, his forms and colors, spread like a jelly and started swaying like a huge floating medusa' (Prokhanov, 2002, p. 22) . While the assimilation of men to animals in earlier novels has been shown to serve primarily racist purposes (see Barta, 2006, p. 131-3 and passim) , the motif of dehumanization in Mr. Hexogen activates (although in profane form) Christian ideas of hell and the fall of man. It also draws parallels with Stalinist rhetoric, in which 'public enemies' were denied the right to human dignity and dealt with as 'filth' or 'vermin'. In sum, the idea of Russian Christian Stalinism equates any derogation from state interests with an inexpiable, deadly sin.
The public acclaim for Mr. Hexogen, a text with an undisguised antiSemitic bias and many xenophobic references, expanded the limits of tolerance concerning these topics; it encouraged a number of younger 'patriotic' writers (such as Yelizarov, Lichutin, Shargunov and Prilepin) to speak their mind. While literary pacesetters of the 1990s such as Viktor Pelevin or Vladimir Sorokin addressed the interaction of the remnants of Soviet ideology with the postcommunist media culture, these younger writers are obsessed with filling today's ideological vacuum by drawing on chauvinistic, neo-imperial and Eurasian ideas.
In this campaign for moral recovery and ideological health care, however, Prokhanov tops them all. His attack on the allegedly degrading liberalism professed by the West is steeped in militarism and serves as a eulogy to the secret police and a celebration of war. In the recent 15-volume collection of his works, each volume offers a different photograph of the author facing the title page; while several volumes recall journalistic or military missions in Afghanistan, Africa or Chechnya and present Prokhanov in corresponding apparel (for instance, costumed as a mujahedeen in Soviet Afghanistan; Prokhanov, 2010, vol. 1, p. 2) , the volume featuring his novel The Africa Expert (Prokhanov, 2010, vol. 2, p. 2) opens on a photograph of the author posing with his pistol holster and Kalashnikov but clad in nothing but his swimming shorts.
The deadly ridiculousness of these self-portraits points to a specific aspect of Prokhanov's fundamentalist and totalitarian leanings -his polemics against writers accused of carnivalesque subversion as defined in Mikhail Bakhtin's literary studies. In late Soviet and post-Soviet literature, the mode of the carnivalesque allowed the dominant culture's normative assumptions to be challenged through the use of humorous and grotesque modes. The writers considered irony and derision to be both a guarantee for the freedom of thought and a way of escaping the dualism between good and evil, the holy and the profane. Prokhanov campaigns relentlessly against this literary strategy, which he presents as a dangerous subversion of all ethical norms. The collapse of the Soviet Union provides him with a conclusive proof of this assumption; this event, in Prokhanov's view, was accompanied by a concert of laughter, scorn and derision. The novel The Political Scientist contains an episode in which 'yellow worms of laughter' invade the public sphere and drive the thoughtless nation to self-destruction:
While lots of people, from one ocean to the other, were dying from hunger, freezing to death in cold houses, putting their head into the noose [ . . . ], the entire country was roaring with laughter [ . . . ] . And splitting its side with laughter, the people agreed to a tenfold increase in fuel prices, to the surrender of forests and water reservoirs to private owners, and to the stationing of American Navy infantry around Russian nuclear sites. (Prokhanov, 2005a, p. 432) The confrontation between chaos and order is the keynote of Prokhanov's writing. His alternative to the carnival of laughter and parody is the feast of vengeance. The novel The Fifth Empire, published in 2007, offers telling images such as the brutal demolition of a casino, a nightclub and an abortion clinic. Instead of the humorous subversion of an oppressive political or normative order (as described by Bakhtin), Prokhanov can think only of the merciless eradication of whatever stands in the way of his raging fanaticism. The only point on which Prokhanov can compromise is the necessary degree of state authoritarianism. Having repeatedly criticized Putin for being insufficiently strong-handed, he has more recently praised Putin's politics: I see a dynamics here. As always, when confronted with a choice between chaos and state power, I opt for state power; within the limits of my humble abilities, I am trying to give this state a new impetus and to breathe new life into its body. I cannot do otherwise. (Prokhanov, 2013a) For Prokhanov, the fact that in the early 1990s Russia chose the path of bourgeois institutions -in his terms, of chaos -was not only a national misfortune but also his personal tragedy. The writer's and his protagonist's revolt, however, is quite metaphysical, confined to meditations bordering on religion and the supernatural. The novel Inscription provides an example of the psychic exercise leading to the 'mystical' core of his speculation: Prokhanov's protagonists delve into the depths of their own self in order to reach Russia's deepest civilizational layers and grasp her historical mission. Not content with crudely perverting the psychological novel into a peculiar mix of tendentious journalism and quasi-mystic speculation, the writer feels obliged to name Andrei' Platonov and Vladimir Nabokov as godfathers of his work. 4 Prokhanov's Manichaean, pseudo-Christian worldview would be incomplete without the figure of a savior, or the 'Chosen One', who resolves the fight between good and evil. The Chosen One appears as an inconspicuous figure that mysteriously, at times almost homoerotically, captivates Belosel'tsev's attention:
Belosel'tsev tried to catch every faint gesture and every throwaway word of the Chosen One in order to divine what the future would bring. He was happy that the Chosen One, when being surrounded by enemies, never exposed himself. He remained unknown to them as if he were tucked in an invisible cloud that gave him cover. [ . . . ] Belosel'tsev admired his patience and calmness. He stopped looking at him in order not to weaken the Chosen One's defense by his gaze. But then, again he couldn't help glancing at him, trying to grasp the essence of a person whom he had already started to serve, to whom he had sworn an oath of loyalty and for whom he would voluntarily die if necessary. (Prokhanov, 2002, p. 30) Since the mission of the Chosen One is the seizure of state power, Belosel'tsev's absolute loyalty acquires an extra meaning: It is the unconditional submission of an individual to the state. This service constitutes a central element of the protagonist's identity. Prokhanov's image of the Chosen One differs widely from Dubovitskii''s conception: His leader is not a pure media product, but rather the embodiment of popular aspirations that fill the hollowness of the simulacrum. But while resolutely rejecting the society of the spectacle, Prokhanov definitively agrees with Dubovitskii' on another point; each affirms the sheer irrelevance of any attempt to critically reflect upon, let alone to question, the Russian state.
Celebrating terror: Zakhar Prilepin's Sankya
Compared to Prokhanov's gnostic myth of the state, the fiction of the younger Zakhar Prilepin traces a more lively and adventurous roadmap for the ascent of the national leader. Prilepin's fiction and essays show traces of his turbulent biography; he was a special forces officer serving in Chechnya before becoming a prominent member of the banned National-Bolshevik party (NBP). Long before the mass protests that followed the country's fraudulent parliamentary and presidential elections, he had acquired the reputation of a fierce critic of the current political regime and was considered a public intellectual with a clear anti-Putin stance. Our interpretation will have to resolve the paradox of a seemingly oppositional writer providing arguments that legitimate a regime vociferously fought on many points. With his novel Sankya, first published in 2006, Prilepin jumped into the ranks of Russia's most successful authors of the decade. The novel depicts the unsteady life of Sasha Tishin, a young man who leaves his small town near Moscow to join the nationalist militants of The Union of Founding Creators (Russian: Soiuz sozidaiushchikh, with the significant abbreviation SS). Initially taking part in antiregime demonstrations, brawls with Caucasian immigrants and games of cat and mouse with Putin's police forces, the military branch of the Founders soon turns to increasingly violent actions intended to force the liberation of imprisoned SS president Kostenko. This character is transparently modeled on Eduard Savenko (more widely known under his pen name Eduard Limonov), the founder and leader of the National-Bolshevik Party.
While depicting these actions, Prilepin tries to gain the reader's sympathy for his protagonist, telling the touching story of a young man in search of friendship and true love in an environment of youthful protest and romantic rebellion. Sasha Tishin finds himself isolated from his parents' generation; his father, a philosophy professor, had succumbed to alcoholism and died a year and a half before the novel opens. His mother, 'tired, like every Russian woman who had been alive for more than half a century,' works long shifts and has little time to follow the development of her son. She believes he is attending the university lectures of a liberal philosopher, Aleksei' Bezletov, once a pupil of Sasha's father, and is politically too naive to grasp his radicalism or the danger of the company he is keeping. Sasha's romantic life is also far from successful; he falls in love with a Moscow girl, who is erotically attractive and feigns affection for him while in fact coldheartedly seeking only to further her own interests. Thus, the tender story ends in betrayal and disillusionment. The only affective ties Sasha can find are with his grandparents who live surrounded by poor, old people in a vanishing village located some 500 km away from Sasha's hometown and thus completely cut off from modern life.
Prilepin's narrative geography draws an opposition between the dangerous presence of an alienating urban sphere and a distant Russian countryside that offers friendship and solidarity, but is helpless and doomed to decline. To this opposition, Prilepin adds the framework of two separate timelines -the cynical times of post-Soviet Russia and the 'homely' Soviet era. The antithesis of center versus periphery, and the axiological discrepancy between the two historical periods constitute the basic structure of the novel. The post-Soviet era is characterized by the fragmentation and anonymity of life under capitalism. In contrast to the aberrations of modern Russia, the Soviet epoch is depicted nostalgically as a time of harmony and mutual understanding between the generations; from this perspective, the country's history is deemed to have followed a linear and transparent course, with the various territories and ethnic groups (including the nonRussian peoples) forming a 'healthy' imperial organism (Khitrov, 2013, p. 261-8) .
However, Prilepin is less obsessed than Prokhanov with memorializing the Soviet Union as a stronghold of justice and solidarity; he is much more interested in the toils and sufferings required to recover the Soviet era. To give this interest a conceptual background, he turns to the writings of Lev Gumilev (1912-92) , an heir of Eurasianism who serves as a non-Marxist surrogate of late Soviet imperial thought. Gumilev's theory of passionarnost' (passionate action, vital force) is a racial conception of culture that emphasizes the will to power in the identity of a given ethnic group. The races endowed with special energy, called passionarii, are characterized by clarity of mind, the ability to mobilize other people, and by great zest for action and sacrifice. Gumilev's passionarii serve as a rather precise group portrait of Prilepin's Founders: an extremist group of predominantly young people who in their fight for another Russia resort to means of knightly self-sacrifice but also of ruthless terror. A faithful adept of passionarnost', Prilepin's protagonist holds that violence is an innocent symbol of personal and collective energy and that the desire to destroy signifies an enhanced vital capacity. In this regard, violence can legitimately substitute for any serious reflection on the country's future: 'We kill each other in Russia, because some understand the truth one way, and the others, another way. This is a massacre, but it's also truth-seeking' (Prilepin, 2014, p. 70) .
The 'passionate' destruction derived from this theory has a privileged object: the modern European-style cities, which Gumilev's doctrine condemned as 'areas of human chimeras' based on an 'unnatural form of life'. It is hardly surprising, then, that Prilepin's protagonist finds the remnants of the Soviet past not in the metropolitan cities (arguably the most visible products of Soviet modernization) but in the depressed and almost deserted village of his grandparents, which epitomizes a backward, stagnating country. Although Sasha cannot get accustomed to this rural setting, he becomes increasingly estranged from city life: 'The city turned out to be weak, toy-like -breaking it open was as meaningless as breaking open a toy: there was nothing inside, only a plastic emptiness' (Prilepin, 2014, p. 23) .
As the novel proceeds, Prilepin gradually shifts the antiurban rhetoric in an antimodern and anti-Western direction. This is the origin of the next imbroglio: The 'Founders' entrust Sankya with the mission of assassinating a Latvian judge whom the party holds responsible for the persecution of their brothers-in-arms, as well as for oppressing Russian fellow countrymen that settled in Latvia in Soviet times. This episode of the novel bears distinct parallels to a series of real events: on the one hand, to the spectacular murder of Latvian judge Jānis Laukroze, supposedly assassinated by Russian right-wing radicals in 2001 and, on the other, to the scandal caused by former Soviet officers living in independent Latvia who boasted of having killed Latvian civilians in reprisal for partisan attacks in 1944. 5 Prilepin sets the scene for Sasha's Latvian mission with descriptions of Riga in which he represents the old-town architecture and well-ordered coziness of the Baltic capital as an entirely hostile surrounding in which Sasha feels only the aggressive pulse of Europe:
He walked across town and felt that the streets and squares loathed him. These resentful, boring spaces seemed to want to push him out. And all of that angry, biting, pulsating energy he had inside was no longer enough to fend them off. (Prilepin, 2014, p. 282) The author emphasizes the dilemma faced by the protagonist and his fellow militants in their struggle for Russia's imperial future: They view Latvia as a part of Russia's legacy that should be protected and administered, but can hardly deal with this legacy. Latvia's community of former Soviet Russians remains literally speechless throughout the novel; the humiliations they allegedly suffer must be assumed by default. The Russian-speaking minority thus remains a simple object of imperial concern. The main ideological challenge stems from the political absorption of Latvia into Europe; Sasha realizes the total incompatibility between Europe and Russia. This conclusion explains much of the protagonist's further actions, as well as the message of the novel as such. For Sasha the expedition to Riga functions as an initiation; he now feels a distinct readiness to kill and die for his cause. He takes this preparedness back with him to Russia, where he ultimately finds himself at the head of a bloody rebellion with obscure goals and a murky outcome. In the last chapter of Sankya, the reader witnesses an armed SS attack on an army base, the theft of heavy weaponry after a violent shoot-out with the guards and later the brutal takeover of the governor's administrative building. With barely concealed empathy, Prilepin presents his protagonist at the end of the novel in the governor's office. When he runs across Bezletov, his former university teacher now transformed into a regime official, he flings the man from the window of the high building into the street. Then Sasha leans out the window with his Kalashnikov (a mortar at his side), addresses the armored corps now encircling the governor's building and rejects their ultimatum to surrender.
In sum, Sankya and his comrades stage a bloody attack on Putin's regime. Yet, Prilepin evades identification with any particular ideological stance. In his essays, his attacks on Russian liberals are as pointed as those against leftists or right-wing 'patriots'. This affected complexity is much less a sign of the author's moral or intellectual ambition than a specific mode of 'political unconsciousness' that has been characterized as follows:
For Prilepin, the political sphere is defined as the political unconscious. [ . . . ] readers often accused Sankya of not making the ideology of its heroes explicit. I have the impression, however, that this is precisely the central feature of the novel. [ . . . ] the ideology inspiring San'kia and his companions-in-arms is situated on the level of instincts and emotions, not of consciousness. (Lipovetsky, 2012, p. 167) Hence, the political ideology of Sankya should not be mistaken as 'inconsequent' or 'inconsiderate' (Khitrov, 2013) ; rather, it is quite intentionally obscure. The few unambiguously formulated goals of the Founders include a war against the current political system, a call for a social and national revolution/and the restoration of empire on the territory of the former Soviet Union. It is at this point that Prilepin's anti-Putin stance and simultaneous legitimation of the system merge; the paradox of protesters or militant groups 'greasing the wheels' of an authoritarian regime begins to resolve. In fact, Prilepin's Founders push the regime in a direction to which Putin's entourage in recent times has taken a quite undisguised likingthe course of openly fighting liberals, democrats, and 'Westerners' at large. Indeed, the country's ruling elite has long since taken the way of traditional values, imperial ambitions and Holy Russia (see Besançon, 2012) . From this perspective, political extremism is not a real disturbance, as it opens up welcome options, in particular the opportunity to (1) present a centrist façade (as an arbiter of what is politically acceptable) and (2) use extremist street violence as backdrop for a conspicuous imposition of order, or in other words, for a show of police performance. These phenomena undoubtedly have to do with legitimation. At the same time, they fit into the definition of 'negative identity' or 'negative mobilization' put forward by Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov:
Negative mobilization refers to a dissemination of diffuse aggression and images of the enemy, together with a growth in anxiety about the future and the loss of values. In such a situation, the need becomes stronger for the security of the collective. [ . . . ] A mobilization of this nature destroys all hope that people can achieve goals together; it destroys any faith in a better future and in the attainability of ideals. (Gudkov, 2007, p. 3-4) The invention of enemies prompts endless narratives about the country's true identity and the heroes called upon to defend it. The study of literary texts -and of Prilepin's novel in particular -can be a valuable counterpart to the sociological observation of negative identity and its political repercussions. Sankya plays with the reader's longing for a national hero while suggesting that real social changes cannot be achieved by majority vote, inclusive dialogue or broad national consensus, but only through violent action led by a radicalized minority. This stance implies a readiness for heroic death. People who do not share this self-destructive pathos cannot be considered true Russians: 'Russia is nourished on the souls of her sons -she thrives on them. Not by the righteous ones, but by the cursed. I am her son, even if I'm cursed' (Prilepin, 2014, p. 339 ).
Sasha's passionate struggle is often referred to as the desire to retrieve the homeland he was robbed of, a theme to which Prilepin frequently returns in his essays. But there is also a more down-to-earth outcome to the struggle -the seizure of political power, which for Sasha and his friends becomes a goal in and for itself:
In our time, the new ideologies are . . . instincts! Actions! [ . . . ] All that sustains us in the world -none of this requires evidence and justification. Only one thing matters to us now: changing the country, changing the world -in our image, because we're better. In order to create peace, we need power -that's all. Those who join me in the pleasures of taking, dividing and multiplying the power -they are my brothers. (Prilepin, 2014, p. 178)
The Founders are not really driven by the desire to fight the aberrations of Russia's political system; the Soviet-style egalitarian rhetoric and the characters' frequent appeals to the people or the motherland are pure decoration. Their central aim is to conquer the top of the Russian 'power vertical'; hence, Latvia -and any neighbor country with a Russian minority -plays a strategic role as a deployment zone for a future Russian revolution.
As the much-desired national renaissance of Russia is obstructed by social atomization and the estrangement between the generations, the national community is imagined as extending beyond the Russian borders. The restoration of the Russian state starts with the rescue of the compatriots living abroad. Prilepin's text 'Terra Tartarara', a prophetic essay published in 2009, predicts mass uprisings starting in Russia shortly after the outbreak of a war in Eastern Ukraine. In this essay, numerous Russian volunteers are depicted as heading to 'New Russia' in order to protect their compatriots; once having gathered military experience in the 'Ukrainian civil war', they return to Russia to resume fighting on the 'home front' (Prilepin, 2009, p. 7-14) .
III 1. Literary figures of legitimation: Symbolic politics and the state of exception
While our introductory chapters (I.1-2) sought to grasp the diffuse influences exerted on the political convictions of Russian citizens by literary works and the media, we will now relate the devices and motifs of the three novels examined (II.1-3) to a notion of legitimation that renders our findings at least approximately compatible with the analyses performed in the other chapters of this volume. For a start, Russian-managed democracy has not been broadly capable of making an emotional connection with the population. In recent years -mainly since the presidency of Dmitrii' Medvedev and Vladimir Putin's third term -the system's political quasi-institutions and staged elections have deteriorated into rituals that have not produced a substantial legitimating effect (see Gudkov, 2007) . The 2011-12 mass protest revealed the fragility of simulated political institutions when defied by an outraged public. The demonstrations organized by Alexei Naval'nyi', which denounced the Kremlin-run United Russia as a 'party of thieves and crooks', inflicted a devastating blow on the regime's political image. The administration tried to fend off the attacks through a renewal of its political rhetoric and through a transformation and strict control of the media landscape, but it was unable to sidestep this far-reaching challenge to its authority (see Sapper et al., 2014 , which contains important studies written by Russian observers).
The Weberian 'pure types of legitimate domination', which include (1) traditional legitimation (through appeal to the authority of the 'eternal yesterday'), (2) charismatic domination based on confidence in individual leadership qualities and (3) domination based on a popular belief in the validity of the legal framework and 'functional competence' (Weber, 1978, p. 212-301) , apply to the Russian case to various degrees. Our three authors' preferences lie clearly with the legitimacy provided by a charismatic leader. However, the embodiments of charisma as staged by Dubovitskii'-Surkov and by Prokhanov are 'nothing but literature'; indeed, they echo the Russian media in their fruitless efforts to portray a president endowed with a 'personal gift of grace' (ibid., p. 216). And maybe it is precisely this deficit as a charismatic leader that forced Putin to play recently the card of the 'elected warlord' (in Weber's terms) -as he had previously done in pressing for the second Chechen war in 1999 (see Section II.2).
Leslie Holmes integrates Weber's three ideal types into a dynamic system containing nine determinants of legitimation. The aspects of this system that interest us most are legitimation through 'goal rationality' instead of the formal-legal rationality of Western systems, through eudaemonism, through official nationalism, through traditionalismthat is, the identification with predecessors known to have been popular, and through an explicit contrast between current policies and those of a past regime or system believed to have been delegitimized (Holmes, 2010, p. 106-8) . We may start with those elements that lend themselves to comparatively simple analysis. Thus, eudaemonism was temporarily very effective for the purposes of Putin's legitimation. His economic performance was initially judged as impressive, but this assessment suffered with time: firstly, because industrial development proved to be highly one-dimensional (focused on raw materials) and therefore susceptible to market crises, and secondly, because the resulting wealth was distributed very unequally. While Prilepin does allude to such legitimacy deficits, and Dubovitskii'-Surkov does zealously flatter the well-to-do 'users', our writers are not urgently preoccupied with eudaemonism.
Their attention goes rather to types of legitimation that hinge either on traditionalism -specifically the 'identification of the leader with predecessors known to have been popular' -or on the explicit contrast of their 'policies with those of a past regime or system [ . . . believed] to have been delegitimized'. Prokhanov and Prilepin both are deeply concerned with the politics of history and the ideological affiliations positively declared or repudiated by the regime. Thus, liberalism and a privatized market economy are considered to be aspects of a delegitimized regime, while Stalin makes a remarkable comeback as a (rediscovered, or rather reinvented) popular leader. 6 Prokhanov's and Prilepin's fiction is also focused on official nationalism as a means of legitimation; possible exclusionary effects regarding non-Russian nationalities as well as the threat that neighboring countries may see in Russian nationalism -elements regarded by sociologists as having been symptomatic of a deepening regime crisis since 2005 (Gudkov, 2007, p. 2) -are cheerfully disregarded.
The most surprising historical resurgence is the writers' penchant for narratives inspired by goal rationality instead of the formal-legal rationality of Western systems. This means that administrative procedures or the leader's political actions are given legitimacy through reference to an overarching goal or concept, such as (formerly) 'communism' or (currently) the 'restoration of the empire', the 'Eurasian Union' or the like. Motives for citizen compliance are thus situated far beyond the institutional domain and do not include reference to a specific legal framework. This resonates with fiction's traditional use as a venue for a reworking of the nation's historical memory or cultural and political identity -or, in other words, for the deployment of symbolic politics.
All three writers under review adhere to an idea of legitimation that differs substantially from the approach of liberal politics. According to their novels, Russian politics requires a leader empowered with the special competences conferred by a state of exception. For all three, the reflection on legitimate rule is intimately linked with the distinction between friend and enemy. Let us recall Lev Gudkov's definition of negative mobilization as fuelling a constant invention of enemies (see above; Gudkov, 2007) . Dubovitskii''s ruling circles are defending a status quo threatened by popular unrest and egalitarian claims. Prokhanov evokes a mysticism of sheer state power that seeks justification in the gnostic threat of foreign attacks -by the United States, by Jewish oligarchs or by Western capitalism. Prilepin, finally, turns his back on all institutions whatsoever; the militant party in Sankya apes the National-Bolshevist Party -not as an institution, however, but as the simple receptacle of passionarnost', a frame for permanent mobilization reminiscent of Georges Sorel's theory of the general strike.
The hidden idol behind these conceptions of decisionist legitimation is German legal philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888 Schmitt ( -1985 . The vulgarized versions of his writings that circulate in Russia avidly expound his antiliberal and antidemocratic tenets: the idea that the political realm is determined by the designation of enemies; disdain for parliamentary democracy; and geopolitical ambitions aiming at the construction of an imperial superpower. The persistence of Schmitt's impact becomes strikingly evident when we confront our authors -Dubovitskii'-Surkov, Prokhanov and Prilepin -with one of the early post-Soviet readings of Schmitt, Aleksandr Dugin's adaptation of the German's conception to the Eurasian ideal, entitled 'Carl Schmitt: Five Lessons For Russia', composed in 1991 and published the following year (see Dugin, 2001) .
The lessons Dugin derives from Schmitt's writings are summarized in five chapters that expound a single principle each. These are the following: (1) Politics should be given absolute priority over the economy, law and the deliberative public sphere; (2) the essence of politics is to distinguish between friends and enemies; (3) this urgent decision is to be made under a state of exception, 7 not after public or parliamentary debate; (4) politics must submit to imperatives inherent in the order of continental spaces (Großraumordnung); and (5) politics today is confronted with a world continuously at war, and the risk of defeat can only be contained if politicians develop -and eventually proceed to the practical application of -a doctrine of partisan combat.
We do not intend to present Dugin's five commandments as the dominant creed confessed by contemporary Russian writers. But in viewing Schmitt's theories, Dugin's exegesis of them, and the three novels examined here as independent statements, the analogies and correspondences between them become strikingly evident. Dubovitskii'-Surkov's strategy of providing legitimacy to the top figures of Putin's regime has already been noted; he depicts their performance against the backdrop of a state of emergency demanding urgent decisions that arein the emphatic sense of Schmitt/Dugin -strictly 'political' and thus need not heed any statutory constraints. Thus, politics unbound on the one hand means legal nihilism; or in Dugin's words: 'Giving law an absolute significance is a veiled attempt to "close history", to deprive history of its creative, passionate dimension ( . . . )' (Dugin, 2001, p. 158; our italics) . However, the passionate thrust of Dugin's Eurasianism, already mentioned in connection with Prilepin (see Section II.3) , as well as the former's obsession with enemies eliminate all moral fetters that might constrain political action. This statement also holds for Prokhanov's literary worlds. The author of Mr. Hexogen can easily be imagined as agreeing with Dugin's assessment of the post-Soviet condition:
The theory of the 'state of exception' and the related issue of the decision (Entscheidung) are of paramount importance for us today, because we find ourselves at a point in the history of our people and our state where the 'state of exception' has become the natural state of the nation [ . . . ] . (Dugin, 2001, p. If it is the others that take the decision, i.e. in the first place the supporters of the 'approach common to all mankind ', of 'universalism' and 'egalitarianism' [ . . . ] , then not only our future will be 'nonRussian', will be 'drowned in average mankind' and, after all (if we think of the survival of our people, state, and nation), will be 'null and void'. At the same time, our past will be senseless as well; the drama of our great Russian history will turn into a stupid farce if we take the path toward globalization and toward the complete cultural leveling in 'generalized mankind' and in 'the hell of an absolute juridical reality'. (Dugin, 2001, p At this point, our examination of Dugin as a possible blueprint for our three writers has come full circle: Dubovitskii', Prokhanov and Prilepin actually celebrate the 'candidly illegitimate' forms of guerrilla warfare that Dugin examines in his conclusion:
If we do not turn to ideology in order to arm the state, which temporarily can be taken from us by our enemies, we will certainly and without fail provide an ideological weapon to the Russian partisan who wakes up today to accomplish his continental mission in places that remind us now of 'foggy Albion': in Riga and Vilnius, [and . . . ] Thus, even Sasha Tishin's Riga terrorist attack appears to be anticipated by Dugin's theory, which was issued well before actually being put into practice by Russian right-wing activists or becoming a memorable event in the hands of a Russian writer. Our shorthand presentation of Schmitt (via Dugin) has been unable to develop all aspects of this singular German-Russian exchange and its literary impact. But at this point, it appears safe to say that all three examined writers champion (paraphrasing Dugin) 'candidly illegitimate' forms of governance and political struggle. The astute use of Schmitt allows Dugin to give the phenomenon of 'negative mobilization' an exalted turn by couching it in the language of self-defense, Russian traditions and dignity. But language is also treacherous to the extent that it is able to conceal (an insight hardly surprising to the literary scholar). Thus, purportedly candid slogans that flirt with Dugin's illegitimacy betray on closer inspection a striking affinity with hate speech. Lofty speculation and noble talk notwithstanding, it is the language of hatred and the appetite to kill that unites Dubovitskii''s cynicism, Prokhanov's statism and Prilepin's rebellious passion. Of course there are alternative examples of violent language in contemporary Russian literature, including in works by authors who can hardly be accused of supporting authoritarianism. For example, Vladimir Sorokin's novels offer a far-reaching exploration of the various languages of violence, denouncing not just the violent potential of the official language but also the destructive dynamics of violence-based identities.
Our three authors are quite impervious to this kind of reflection, however; their order of the day is the glorification of violent action and its artistic exploitation. The success of Prilepin and his epigones (such as Shargunov or Yelizarov) responds to -but also exacerbates -a public demand for violence. Literature is left behind; unlike the society of the spectacle, with its laid-back contemplation of political reality, the negatively mobilized community requires action in which it can take part, as it were, performatively. It did not have to wait for long.
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 2014-15: Cynicism triumphant (a postscript)
The Russian annexation of Crimea and the military onslaught on Ukraine resounded with ruling elites' readiness to accept the language of hatred and violence as a social standard. People who resisted this negative mobilization were by contrast stigmatized as traitors to the nation. It is hardly surprising that writers seized this occasion to sharpen their positions. In an article entitled 'On the Way to Crimea', Prokhanov celebrated the end of the post-Soviet era and the beginning of a new epoch characterized by mass mobilization around the figure of Vladimir Putin. This development, he argued, will be followed by an ideological reset, the restoration of Russia's military and industrial strength and a crusade against the country's enemies . Zakhar Prilepin responded to the new geopolitical situation with a series of essays in which he attacked the 'unpatriotic' behavior of certain elements of the Russian elites (especially the oligarchs), and expressed the hope that the war in Ukraine would eventually lead to large purges among their ranks (Prilepin, 2014a) .
The shift from the laissez-faire liberalism of the 1990s to a society intoxicated by negative mobilization inevitably raised the question as to when media spectacle and ritualized electoral procedures would be exhausted as a source of regime authority. This moment came perilously close with the 2011 and 2012 protest marches. Consequently, the regime seized all the more eagerly on the Kiev Maidan movement to justify an increasing dependence on noninstitutional forms of legitimation. Identity politics and imperial vistas, the discourse on Russia's destiny and historical mission, the search for enemies and the eradication of 'Western values' appear since to have obtained the upper hand over the quest for democracy, an active civil society and the rule of law.
7. In Schmitt's writings, the 'state of exception' (Ausnahmezustand) is distinguished from a constitutionally stipulated 'state of emergency' (Notstand) in order to emphasize the extralegal origin and nature of the former. 8. The end of the quotation printed in italics ('maybe, it is only . . . ') does not appear in the 2001 reprint of Dugin's article. We draw on the Internet version of the text http://arctogaia.org.ru/article/23. 9. As in the case of the previous quotation, the italicized words figure only in the 1992 (and Internet) version of the article. 10. Years of publication indicated in square brackets refer to original editions that were not available and are quoted on the basis of reprints or reeditions.
